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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 27, 1994, two men shot and murdered Felipe Angeles outside of a
Los Angeles apartment.1 The apartment was being used as a brothel at the time.2
John Jones, the building owner and brothel operator, told police that he saw the
1. Michael S. Perry, Obie Anthony, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (Apr. 13, 2015),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3824 (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
2. Id.
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3

shooter running away from the scene with an injured leg. Weeks later, police
arrested Obie Anthony and Reggie Cole, two teenage black men, for a carjacking
unrelated to the murder of Felipe Angeles.4
Jones later identified Anthony and Cole in a police lineup as the shooters he
saw run away from the scene of Felipe Angeles’ murder.5 Jones testified against
both men at trial, claiming he saw them clearly at the scene and that he had not
6
received benefits for his testimony. No physical or forensic evidence linked
7
Anthony to the murder. In 1995, a jury convicted both Cole and Anthony of
first-degree murder, and sentenced them to life without parole.8
Anthony requested assistance from the California Innocence Project after the
Innocence Project successfully overturned Cole’s conviction for prosecutorial
misconduct.9 The Northern California Innocence Project assumed Anthony’s case
in 2008.10 In 2010, Anthony filed a writ of habeas corpus for ineffective
11
assistance of counsel, actual innocence, and prosecutorial misconduct. The court
subsequently found that the prosecution’s key witness, Jones, perjured himself
12
and later recanted identifying Anthony as the second shooter. The court also
found that the district attorney acted improperly when he failed to correct Jones’
false statement that he did not receive special treatment for his testimony,
withheld witness statements from defense counsel, and failed to notify defense
counsel that another trial witness “incorrectly picked a ‘filler’”13 when shown a
14
suspect lineup for the first time. The judge subsequently vacated Anthony’s

3. Christina Kyriacou, Friends Wrongfully Imprisoned for Nearly Two Decades—Until the Innocence
Project Won Their Freedom, L.A. WEEKLY (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.laweekly.com/news/friends-wrong
fully-imprisoned-for-nearly-two-decades-until-the-innocence-project-won-their-freedom-2611790 (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Jack Dolan, Judge Overturns Murder Conviction in 1994 Slaying, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2011),
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/01/local/la-me-conviction-overturned-20111001 (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
7. Frank Stotlze, Obie Anthony Released after 1995 Murder Conviction Overturned, S. CAL. PUB. RADIO
(Oct. 5, 2011), http://www.scpr.org/news/2011/10/05/29261/obie-anthony-released-after-murder-convictionover/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
8. Kyriacou, supra note 3.
9. Reggie Cole, CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://californiainnocenceproject.org/read-their-stories/reggiecole/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
10. Id.
11. In re Anthony, 236 Cal. App. 4th 204, 207 (2015).
12. Id.
13. In either a live or photograph lineup, police may insert “fillers,” or people who do not match the
witness description of the suspect, in order to help the suspect stand out to the victim. Eyewitness Identification
Reform, INNOCENCE PROJECT (June 10, 2015), http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/improve-thelaw/fact-sheets/eyewitness-identification-reform (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
14. In re Anthony, 236 Cal. App. 4th at 207.
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conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct. Anthony was released from prison
after serving seventeen years for a crime he did not commit.16
Anthony sued the City of Los Angeles seeking damages for civil rights
17
violations. Anthony settled with the City of Los Angeles for $8.3 million dollars
in April 2015.18 The City of Los Angeles has admitted no wrongdoing.19 Both
Anthony and Cole have lawsuits pending against Los Angeles County seeking
20
compensation for their time in prison.
The prosecutor plays a crucial role in affecting incarceration rates because
prosecutors have “more control of life, liberty, and reputation than any other
21
person in America.” The United States currently has the largest prison
population of any country in the world.22 Violent crime in the United States
peaked in the early 1990s.23 The incarceration rate continues to increase despite a
significant decrease in violent crimes since 1991.24 Although wrongful
convictions were once viewed as rare or even nonexistent, technological
advancements continue to shed light on the wrongly convicted, either through
25
exculpatory DNA evidence or the discovery of prosecutorial misconduct.
Not only do wrongful convictions resulting from prosecutorial misconduct
represent an affront to constitutionally guaranteed rights of due process, such
26
wrongful convictions also cost taxpayers millions of dollars. Wrongful
convictions result in “an appeal, an appellate reversal, a retrial, investigational
15. Perry, supra note 1.
16. LA to Pay $8.3 Million Settlement to Obie Anthony, Wrongly Convicted Man, ABC7 NEWS (Apr. 13,
2015), http://abc7.com/news/la-to-pay-$83-million-settlement-to-wrongly-convicted-man/656569/ (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Asher Klein & Ted Chen, Man Wrongfully Convicted for Murder gets $8M Settlement from Los
Angeles, NBC L.A. (Apr. 13, 2015), http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Obie-Anthony-WrongfullyConvicted-Murder-8M-Settlement-Los-Angeles-299605691.html (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (describing the State Bar’s prosecution of a Santa Clara County prosecutor after the discovery that
he concealed existence of a video tape of a rape victim, and denied concealing it while under oath).
20. Perry, supra note 1.
21. CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, AN EPIDEMIC OF PROSECUTOR MISCONDUCT 10 (2013), available
at http://www.prosecutorintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/EpidemicofProsecutorMisconduct.pdf (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review).
22. Id.
23. Crime in California, 1984–2014, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., available
at https://oag.ca.gov/crime (last visited Mar. 6, 2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
24. Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Prosecutors Can Play Role in Ending Mass Incarceration, HUFFINGTON POST
(Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/laurenbrooke-eisen/prosecutors-can-playrole_b_5908010.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
25. Id.; see also Tracey Kaplan, State Bar Charges Santa Clara Prosecutor with Misconduct; Disbarment
Possible, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (May 17, 2013, 11:43 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_20646441/
state-bar-charges-santa-clara-county-prosecutor-misconduct (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
26. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963); CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, supra note 21.
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efforts to trace the real offender, possible civil lawsuits, and compensatory
payments.”27 For example, forty-five wrongful convictions in Texas cost
taxpayers an estimated $8.6 million.28 Society has a vested interest in fair trials,
not only to reduce such costs, but also because the “system of administration of
justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.”29
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The criminal discovery process developed on both a national level and in
30
California over the last fifty years. In Brady v. Maryland and subsequent cases,
the Supreme Court held that prosecutors have a constitutional duty to disclose
exculpatory information that is material to the criminal defendant.31 California
responded to these developments in the law and implemented Penal Code
sections 1054.00-.10 in order to strengthen victims’ rights and increase judicial
32
efficiency. Because of this strengthening of the law, subsequent attempts to
amend it have failed; Governor Brown believes that California law provides
enough statutory and criminal procedure safeguards to prevent and address
33
prosecutorial misconduct.
A. Brady v. Maryland
Brady v. Maryland is the seminal case that established that prosecutors have
a constitutional duty to divulge exculpatory evidence to defendant’s counsel in
34
criminal prosecutions. Brady established that the right to due process is just as
35
important as successful criminal prosecutions.

27. CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, supra note 21, at 2.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87–88 (holding that the “suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused violates due process when the evidence is material to either guilt or punishment, irrespective of
good faith or bad faith of the prosecutor”); People v. Robinson, 31 Cal. App. 4th 494, 499 (1995) (describing
that a prosecutor’s duty to disclose includes not just the exculpatory information in his possession, but the
evidence possessed by the investigative agencies that he has access to).
31. Id. at 83–84.
32. Supra Part II.B.
33. See supra Part II.C (discussing Governor Brown’s veto of attempts to strengthen California’s criminal
discovery laws).
34. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86.
35. Id.
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1. The Brady Decision
The Supreme Court’s holding in Brady requires prosecutors to produce any
exculpatory evidence that could “materially affect a verdict.”36 The prosecutor
intentionally withheld exculpatory information that did not surface until
37
petitioner had been convicted for murder and sentenced to death. The Court
held that suppressing evidence favorable to the accused violates due process, no
38
matter whether the prosecutor acted in good faith or bad faith. Brady
strengthened the idea that society benefits not only when the justice system
39
convicts the guilty, but also when criminal trials are conducted fairly.
Otherwise, prosecutors take on the role of an “architect” who shapes the
proceeding in a way that does not "comport with standards of justice."
2. Brady’s Legacy
Brady attempted to level the playing field between prosecutors and criminal
40
defendants. Although the Constitution does not guarantee the accused a right to
criminal discovery, Brady established withholding of evidence favorable to the
accused amounts to a violation of a criminal defendant’s due process rights.41 The
Supreme Court held as early as 1935 that deliberate deception of either the court
or jurors through the “presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with
‘rudimentary demands of justice,’” but it was not until Brady that the court
42
imposed a constitutional duty on prosecutors. Brady and its progeny case,
Giglio v. U.S., established that a prosecutor's withholding of material and
exculpatory information results in a new trial for the defendant.43 Brady’s legacy
can be seen in subsequent California case law, the development of which led to
the codification of a criminal discovery statutory scheme with Penal Code section
1054.

36. Editorial Board, Rampant Prosecutorial Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/01/05/opinion/sunday/rampant-prosecutorial-misconduct.html?_r=0 (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review); see also Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (holding that suppression of evidence
favorable to the accused violates due process when that evidence is material to “either guilt or punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution”).
37. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.
38. Id. at 87.
39. Id.
40. Cynthia Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the Inference of Innocence, 100
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 422 (2010).
41. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
42. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972).
43. Id. at 150.

466

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 47
B. California Penal Code § 1054.1
California responded to perceptions that the law favored the criminally
accused over crime victims after Brady and enacted Penal Code sections 1054–
44
1054.10. California added section 1054 by initiative in June 1990 after voters
passed Proposition 115 (Prop. 115), the Crime Victims Justice Reform Act.45
Prior to Prop. 115’s passage, California courts decided several notable cases in
46
favor of criminal defendants. For example, People v. Bolton eliminated the
requirement that a defendant must prove that a prosecutor acted in bad faith in
order to prove prosecutorial misconduct occurred.47 Anthony Rackauckas, a
former Deputy District Attorney and Superior Court Judge, helped author Prop.
115 with other California prosecutors in response to the perception that the
California Supreme Court “unnecessarily expanded the rights of accused
criminals far beyond that which is required by the United States Constitution.”48
In addition to shifting the balance of power in criminal proceedings back
towards the accused, Penal Code sections 1054–1054.10 also served to “promote
the ascertainment of truth in trials by requiring timely pretrial discovery,” and
required informal discovery between parties.49 Prop. 115 codified criminal
50
discovery into a “single statutory scheme.” Penal Code section 1054.1 requires
a prosecuting attorney to disclose a variety of evidence, including: names and
addresses of witnesses the prosecutor intends to call at trial, defendants’
statements, all relevant evidence seized as part of an investigation of the charges,
whether any material witness has a previous felony conviction if that witness will
be critical to the trial, and various other relevant witness statements or reports.51
Most importantly, this section requires a prosecutor to disclose any
exculpatory evidence.52 Required disclosures must be made thirty days prior to
trial, unless a party presents a good cause reason for denying, restricting, or
deferring disclosure.53 Good cause exists only in cases of threats or danger to a

44. Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, Prop. 115, § 1(b) (Cal. 1990).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. People v. Bolton, 23 Cal. 3d 208, 214 (1979) (holding that misconduct does not have to be intentional
in order to result in reversible error).
48. Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, Prop. 115, § 1(b) (Cal. 1990); Jerry Hicks, California
Elections/Proposition 115: Court Reform Measure Raises Controversy, L.A. TIMES (May 28, 1990),
http://articles.latimes.com/1990-05-28/local/me-243_1_court-reform (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
49. Id.
50. Laura Berend, Less Reliable Preliminary Hearings and Plea Bargains in Criminal Cases in
California: Discovery Before and After Proposition 115, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 465, 496 (1998).
51. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1 (West 2014).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 1054.7.
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victim or witness’s safety, potential loss of evidence, or the possibility of
compromising other law enforcement investigations.54
California Penal Code section 1054.5 requires a party seeking information to
55
make an informal request to opposing counsel. If opposing counsel fails to
disclose within fifteen days, the requesting party may then seek a court order.56
Courts may prohibit witness testimony upon finding that the party failed to
57
disclose required materials, but only after exhausting other sanctions.
Additionally, the court may advise the jury when a party fails, refuses, or
untimely discloses required evidence.58
Despite Prop. 115’s seemingly positive benefits for the accused, it actually
aimed to restrict benefits for the criminally accused.59 Specifically, Prop. 115
amended the California Constitution to clarify that the “Constitution shall not be
construed by the courts to afford greater rights to criminal defendants than those
60
afforded by the Constitution of the United States.”
California Criminal Jury Instruction 306 (CALCRIM 306) works in
conjunction with Penal Code section 1054.1 to address failures to comply with
disclosure requirements; it also provides courts with the jury instructions to
61
enforce the requirements of Penal Code section 1054.5. CALCRIM 306 allows
a judge to instruct the jury that it can consider a prejudicial discovery violation
when evaluating the evidence.62 CALCRIM 306 remains an important tool to
implement the Penal Code’s criminal discovery requirements.
C. Governor Brown’s Veto of AB 885
In 2014, Governor Brown vetoed AB 885, authored by Assembly Member
63
Tom Ammiano. Assembly Member Ammiano introduced the bill in response to
publicized cases of prosecutorial failure to produce exculpatory evidence leading
to wrongful convictions and long sentences.64 AB 885 would have given courts
discretion to instruct the jury under either Penal Code section 1054.1 or Brady
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id. § 1054.5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24 (codifying Proposition 115).
Id.
JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL. ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION 306 (2006).
62. Id.
63. Steven T. Jones, Ammiano “Angry” as Brown Vetoes Prosecutor Misconduct Bill, S.F. BAY
GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.sfbg.com/politics/2014/09/29/ammiano-angry-brown-vetoesprosecutor-misconduct-bill (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
64. Id.
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after an intentional or knowing failure to disclose materials. It would have
allowed the judge to instruct the jury to consider the failure to disclose when
determining reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.66
The bill ultimately failed because it provided too much of a departure from
current practice, which allowed the judiciary to make decisions on how the jury
should be instructed, and the belief among politicians that the law already
67
provided enough protection against such misconduct
III. CHAPTER 467
Chapter 467 amends section 6086.7 of the Business and Professions Code
and adds section 1424.5 to the Penal Code.68 Chapter 467 requires courts to
inform the State Bar when a prosecuting attorney deliberately and intentionally
withholds exculpatory information in violation of the law, and when that failure
to disclose amounts to bad faith, contributes to a defendant’s guilty verdict or “no
contest” plea, or otherwise seriously limits the defendant’s ability to present his
or her defense.69 The court may initiate a hearing to consider whether a
70
prosecutor or the prosecutor’s office should be disqualified from a case. The
court may directly disqualify a prosecutor upon its own motion after finding that
the prosecutor deliberately and intentionally withheld relevant materials while
acting in bad faith, or when the prosecutor’s office knowingly participated in that
71
withholding as part of a larger pattern of misconduct. Chapter 467 in no way
limits any remedy for such failures to disclose under other applicable law.72
IV. ANALYSIS
Inspired by Brady, Assembly Member Shirley Weber introduced Chapter
467 because prosecutors have an “exclusive obligation to the truth and due
process,” but reports of consistent violations of that duty plagued the criminal
justice system.73 Chapter 467 aims to ensure fair trials for the accused and
65. AB 885, 2014 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. (Cal. 2014).
66. Id.
67. Bob Egelko, Brown Vetoes Bills on Prosecution Misconduct, Drones, OKs Lower Crack Sentences,
S.F. CHRONICLE (Sept. 29, 2014), http://blog.sfgate.com/crime/2014/09/29/brown-vetoes-bills-on-prosecutionmisconduct-drones-oks-lower-crack-sentences/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
68. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6086.7 (amended by Chapter 467); PENAL § 1424.5 (enacted by Chapter
467).
69. PENAL § 1424.5 (enacted by Chapter 467).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Press Release, Off. of Assemb. Member Shirley Weber, Historic Bill on Prosecutor Misconduct
Passes the California State Assembly (Jun. 2, 2015), available at http://asmdc.org/members/a79/news-
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provides mechanisms that should improve the integrity of California’s criminal
justice system by shifting the balance of power back towards a neutral ground
between the accused and the prosecution.74 However, Chapter 467 may prove
difficult to implement due to the practical challenges of discovering prosecutorial
misconduct, influencing the behavior of prosecutors, and disciplining prosecutors
for alleged misconduct.75
A. Ensuring Fair Trials
Chapter 467 will help to ensure fair trials for criminal defendants and reduce
the number of post-conviction appeals.76 Under prior law, criminal defendants
could seek an appeal if they suspected that prosecutorial misconduct materially
affected their convictions.77 However, these appeals take years, and a successful
appeal only corrects a deficiency post-conviction, rather than addressing it when
78
it materializes. Chapter 467 provides California courts with the tools to remove
79
prosecutors at the trial level when discovery violations come to light. This gives
innocent defendants the fair chance that the Supreme Court determined all
80
criminal defendants deserve under Brady.
Thus, Chapter 467 will provide a “fair trial remedy” for criminal defendants,
rather than forcing them to appeal their convictions based on prosecutorial
81
misconduct. When courts actually discover prosecutorial misconduct at the trial
82
level, Chapter 467 allows the court to remove a prosecutor prior to sentencing.
This remedy will provide faster relief for defendants than a post-conviction
83
reversal on appeal. The Orange County District Attorney’s Office’s recent
disqualification in the major death penalty case of mass murderer Scott Dekraai
provides an example of how Chapter 467 will work in conjunction with current
room/press-releases/historic-bill-on-prosecutor-misconduct-passes-the-california-state-assembly (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review) [hereinafter “Historic Bill”].
74. See infra Part IV.A (noting that Chapter 467 seeks to protect the right to a fair trial).
75. See infra Part IV.C (discussing Chapter 467’s attempt to reduce prosecutorial misconduct).
76. Burke E. Strunsky, Why Good Prosecutors Do Bad Things: Pending California Legislation on
Prosecutorial Misconduct, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 22, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/burke-estrunsky/why-good-prosecutors-do-b_b_5855684.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
77. David M. Greenwald, Governor Signs Bill to Aid Wrongly Convicted, But Vetoes Ammiano’s
Prosecutorial Misconduct Bill, PEOPLE’S VANGUARD OF DAVIS (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.davis
vanguard.org/2014/10/governor-signs-bill-to-aid-wrongly-convicted-but-vetoes-ammiano-prosecutorial-miscon
duct-bill/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
78. Id.
79. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1424.5 (enacted by Chapter 467).
80. Greenwald, supra note 77.
81. Elizabeth Napier Dewar, Note, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 YALE L. J. 1450, 1456
(2006).
82. Id. at 1455.
83. Id. at 1457.
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law. The Orange County District Attorney’s Office was disqualified after the
discovery of a systematic, decades-old practice of hiding evidence and colluding
with jailhouse informants for false testimony.85 Under Chapter 467, Judge
Goethals would be required to refer the prosecutors involved in the misconduct to
the State Bar.86 Chapter 467 provides an added layer of protection against
misconduct because it requires courts to refer attorneys to the State Bar when
87
misconduct is discovered. Chapter 467 will not only help to ensure fair trials for
the criminally accused, but its effects will likely improve the integrity of the
criminal justice system if it is widely implemented.
B. Improving the Integrity of the Criminal Justice System
Chapter 467 has the potential to improve the overall integrity of the criminal
88
justice system. There is a growing concern of how cognitive biases can create
89
tunnel vision in prosecutors. Prosecutors face a dilemma due to the inherent
tension in a prosecutor’s divided loyalties: the duty to be an objective officer of
the court and minister of justice, versus the duty to be a zealous advocate for
90
victims. More than half of the people asked to rate the criminal justice system
on how well it ensures “the right people are in prison” responded with “just fair”
or “poor.”91
The advent of new technology has shed light on these divided loyalties and
92
influenced the perception of unfairness in the criminal justice system. Postconviction DNA testing has led to the exoneration of 280 people since 1989.93
When courts fail to hold prosecutors accountable for their duty to produce
exculpatory evidence, then there is “nothing stopping them from abandoning” the
94
duty altogether.

84. Strunsky, supra note 76.
85. Dahlia Lithwick, You’re all Out, SLATE (May 28, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_
politics/jurisprudence/2015/05/orange_county_prosecutor_misconduct_judge_goethals_takes_district_attorney.
html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing that California Attorney General
Kamala Harris announced she will investigate the allegations against the County).
86. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1424.5(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 467).
87. BUS. & PROF. § 6086.7 (amended by Chapter 467).
88. Historic Bill, supra note 73.
89. Strunsky, supra note 76.
90. Id.
91. JILL MIZELL & LOREN SIEGEL, AN OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC OPINION AND DISCOURSE ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE ISSUES 23 (2014), available at http://opportunityagenda.org/files/field_file/2014.08.23-CriminalJustice
Report-FINAL_0.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
92. Id. at 36.
93. Strunsky, supra note 76.
94. Historic Bill, supra note 73.
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Chapter 467 may help to strengthen the integrity of the criminal justice
system, thus improving public perception, since a bad faith failure to produce
required exculpatory information must be reported to the State Bar.95 However, it
remains unclear whether Chapter 467 will have any effect on the behavior of
prosecutors, considering that Chapter 467 only reinforces what prosecutors
already have a legal and constitutional duty to do—disclose exculpatory
96
evidence.
C. Reducing Prosecutorial Misconduct
Although Chapter 467 aims to reduce prosecutorial misconduct, it remains
unclear whether it will actually affect the behavior of prosecutors.97 Discovery
violations are difficult to detect because they occur without the court or the
98
defense counsel knowing. Chapter 467 may prove ineffective if courts cannot
99
uncover attempts to undermine the discovery requirements. In addition, Chapter
467 will fail to affect the system if the State Bar is reluctant to punish
violations.100
1. Concealment of Misconduct Makes it Difficult to Address
A major concern with Chapter 467 is that it will have little effect on reducing
101
prosecutorial misconduct due to the difficult of discovering it. Prosecutorial
abuses often happen covertly and Chapter 467 does not provide any new means
102
to help those secrets come to light. Concealment efforts and refusal to comply
103
with discovery orders also prevent discovery of violations.
The previously mentioned Scott Dekraai trial provides an egregious example
of how concealment prevents misconduct from being discovered by courts for
decades.104 Elaborate coordination amongst prosecutors, jailhouse informants, and

95. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6086.7 (amended by Chapter 467).
96. PENAL § 1424.5 (enacted by Chapter 467).
97. See infra Part IV.C.1–2 (analyzing the difficulties of implementing Chapter 467 due to the potential
that misconduct will not be discovered or violations will go unpunished).
98. Lithwick, supra note 85.
99. See infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing how the covert nature of misconduct makes it difficult to discover
and address).
100. See infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing whether Chapter 467 will be ineffective if the State Bar does not
penalize prosecutors who break the law).
101. Lithwick, supra note 85.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (describing that the Orange County District Attorney’s Office maintained a twenty-five-year-old
database full of potential exculpatory information, the existence of which was never known to defense
counsels).
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the police to improperly elicit confessions from defendants occurred for decades
without discovery.105 The Dekraai Court also uncovered a secret computer
database the Orange County District Attorney’s Office maintained for more than
twenty-five years that contained exculpatory data that government officials
refused to produce, despite numerous discovery orders to do so.106 This ongoing
misconduct shows how long it can go undiscovered.107 If misconduct cannot be
discovered in a timely manner, then Chapter 467 will be obsolete because it
hinges on the discovery of misconduct during trial.108 Even if courts discover
misconduct on a timely basis, it remains unclear whether the State Bar will be to
109
impose meaningful punishments for violations. In addition, Chapter 467 may
not lead to an increase in court referrals to the State bar due to the requirement
that prosecutors must act in bad faith in order to be referred for discipline.110
2. Whether Chapter 467 Will Increase the Number of Meaningful
Disciplinary Actions
It is unclear whether Chapter 467 will increase the number of disciplinary
actions against prosecutors due to the apparent unwillingness of the State Bar to
punish prosecutors, and the difficulty of proving that prosecutors acted in bad
faith.111 Governor Brown vetoed AB 885—a previous attempt to address
prosecutorial misconduct—based on the rationale that judges have a variety of
112
remedies at their disposal if the court discovers a Brady violation during trial.
However, concerns exist that courts rarely apply those remedies because many
judges appointed during tough-on-crime eras are “biased in favor of police and
113
prosecutors.” A 2010 Northern California Innocence Project report found 707
114
cases involving prosecutorial misconduct over an eleven-year period. Only six
out of the 707 prosecutors were disciplined, and courts upheld eighty percent of
the convictions despite improprieties.115
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Furthermore, Chapter 467 may not lead to an increase in meaningful State
Bar disciplinary actions due to the difficulty in demonstrating that a prosecutor
acted in bad faith.116 To demonstrate bad faith, a defendant must show that the
prosecutor was not simply negligent with evidence, but that the prosecutor acted
willfully, deceitfully, or with malicious intent.117
Assembly Member Weber authored Chapter 467 in response to the growing
concern that prosecutors seek to “convict at all costs” and “prioritize convictions
over the truth.”118 Several high profile situations involving prosecutorial
misconduct also prompted Chapter 467.119 Most notably, in Santa Clara County, a
prosecutor, Troy Benson, was charged with five counts of misconduct for
suppressing evidence of a concealed videotaped medical exam of an alleged
victim in a 2006 child molestation case and subsequently denied doing so under
oath.120 The State Bar undertook disciplinary proceedings against Benson,
concluded that he had not committed any act of “moral turpitude, dishonesty, or
121
corruption,” and ordered him to be “publicly reproved.” However, in People v.
Uribe—the underlying case that led to Benson’s disciplinary action—the trial
court dismissed the action with prejudice and held that Benson committed
122
“outrageous prosecutorial misconduct.”
Although the Court of Appeal
overturned the dismissal as an improper remedy for the misconduct, it
acknowledged that the violations were “flagrant.”123
The State Bar’s standard of proof for discipline is higher than the court’s, and
the State Bar failed to find that Benson misled the court by clear and convincing
evidence.124 Nine studies analyzing the professional consequences imposed on
prosecutors for misconduct revealed that out of 3,625 instances of misconduct
from 1963 to 2013, public sanctions were imposed in only sixty-three—a mere
125
two percent—of those cases.
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Although a case can be remanded or thrown out due to prosecutorial
misconduct, in the absence of bad faith, that same case may not be referable to
the State Bar under Chapter 467.126 Furthermore, it is unclear whether State Bar
referrals will lead to any meaningful sanctions due to the State Bar’s even higher
“clear and convincing” standard.127
V. CONCLUSION
A prosecutor in the American criminal justice system has more discretion
128
and power over life and liberty than perhaps any other person in the country.
District attorneys play the role of both the victim’s advocate and minister of
justice.129 Prosecutorial misconduct, once thought to be anomalous, has become a
problem that threatens the right to a fair trial and due process guaranteed by the
130
Constitution and Brady. Although Chapter 467 seeks to redress this problem by
providing additional safeguards beyond the power courts already have to enforce
Brady, Chapter 467’s effectiveness hinges on court’s ability to identify
prosecutorial misconduct.131
Prosecutors were under a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence before
Chapter 467, and Chapter 467 does not change or increase prosecutors’ duties in
any way.132 Moreover, courts had the power to instruct the jury about
133
prosecutorial misconduct before Chapter 467. Thus, it remains unclear whether
Chapter 467 will help courts uncover more prosecutorial misconduct compared to
prior law or whether it will actually influence prosecutorial behavior.134 However,
Chapter 467 will require that courts to refer prosecutors to the State Bar upon
135
discovering a violation. This should, in the long-term, affect a prosecutor’s
136
behavior if the requirement is properly enforced.
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